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INTRODUCTION
In the hundred years since Hohfeld published his two “Fundamental Legal Conceptions”
articles, the “bundle-of-rights” view of property associated with his work has come to enjoy the
status of conventional wisdom in American legal scholarship.1 Seen as a corrective to lay
conceptions and a predecessor “Blackstonian” view of property as the “sole and despotic
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this article, and Anna di Robilant of Part II. We thank Saki Bailey, Yochai Benkler, Hanoch Dagan, Terry Fisher,
Pierre Schlag, and especially Oren Bracha and Henry Smith for feedback on an earlier draft of this article.
1
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 319 (1997) (“No expression better captures the
modern legal understanding of ownership than the metaphor of property as a ‘bundle of rights.’”). As Professor
Alexander points out, the “bundle of rights” phrase precedes Hohfeld, who in fact never used it. Nevertheless, it has
become the conventional moniker for his analysis of property as “a complex aggregate of jural relations.” Id. at 319,
322. For a review of leading legal scholars and casebooks adopting the bundle of rights picture, see Eric Claeys, Is
Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEA. U. L. REV. 617, 619-21 (2009). For a review of leading philosophical works
doing the same, see J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712-14 (1996).
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dominion” of an “owner” over a thing,2 the central insight of Hohfeldian analysis is standardly
taken to be that property is not a single “thing” but rather a “bundle of rights” with respect to
things and persons.3 In recent years, however, this Hohfeldian view has come under increasing
attack by critics calling to replace the bundle-of-rights picture with a return to lay or neoBlackstonian conceptions of property, as the “right to a thing,” “thing-ownership” or, simply,
“the law of things.”4 Yet what precisely is at stake in this dispute has remained somewhat
nebulous. In the words of one critic, although all sides to the debate “agree that the thing versus
ad hoc bundle contrast is significant, it is surprisingly difficult to specify what the contrast really
means.”5 Do the critics really mean to claim that property, as a legal concept, should be taken to
refer to the “thing” or object itself, rather than to legal rights pertaining to it? Or is it rather that
the legal rights should be taken to pertain to a person-thing relation, rather than to one between
persons? Or is it that the rights at issue should be seen as one or a few rather than many? Or, if
many, then necessarily “unified” rather than disaggregated? Or, whether single or multiple,
“absolute” rather than “qualified”? And, finally, is the dispute—with respect to any or all of
these questions—a matter of descriptive or normative or conceptual disagreement?
The crux of the problem, we suggest, is a fundamental mischaracterization of the
Hohfeldian analysis of property—by both critics and defenders. The “bundle of rights” label
obscures from view a distinct—and more fundamental—dimension of Hohfeldian analysis,
namely that property is a social relation. And as or more important than getting right the precise
content of each of these claims is understanding their inter-connection: the “social relations”
claim is the fundamental platform of the analysis, generating in its turn the “bundle of rights”
claim as a conclusion. Indeed, if a short moniker were wanted for Hohfeldian analysis, much
preferable to the “bundle of rights” would be the “relational” conception of property.
2

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (1979) (1765-1769). It is standard to
refer to this view as “Blackstonian” since, as Professors Alexander and Dagan suggest, even if Blackstone himself
“did not intend that phrase to be taken literally,” nevertheless the “dictum … has become an icon of property
theory.” GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 100-01 (2012). For doubts that this
was Blackstone’s own considered view, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108
YALE L. J. 601 (1998); David Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 103 (2009).
For doubts about the doubts, see Claeys, id. at 632-33. We take up this issue below at text accompanying note 24.
3
See, in addition to references cited in note 1, BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 2629, 97-100 (1977); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 15-31 (1990); JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE
PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 3-13 (2000). We hasten to add that a central thrust of our argument in Part I below is that
this standard understanding of the Hohfeldian conception given in the text is, in significant respects, misleading,
when not simply flawed. See generally Part I and especially text accompanying notes 8, 15-17 infra.
4
See Penner, supra note 1 at 799 (“despite the bundle of rights picture of property, property truly is a right to things”);
J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997) (advocating, in place of the bundle of rights picture, the view
“that property is what the average citizen … thinks it is: the right to a thing”); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007) v, 1 (defending, in contrast to “an ad hoc ‘bundle of rights’” view,
a “traditional everyday view” of property as “a right to a thing good against the world”); Claeys, supra note 1 at 618,
631ff (advancing “a ‘thing’ or ‘thing-ownership’ conception of property” in opposition to “‘the ad hoc bundle’
conception”); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691(2012) (arguing that “property
is, after all, a law of things” contrary to the “conventional wisdom” that “property is a bundle of rights”). See generally
Symposium: Property: A Bundle of Rights? 8 ECON. J. WATCH (2011). We use “neo-Blackstonian” here as an umbrella
term to group those critics of the Hohfeldian conception, such as the foregoing, who propose to replace it with a
“thing”-based alternative of some sort. We do so while noting, again, that there remains debate on the extent to which
Blackstone himself subscribed to what is called the “Blackstonian” conception—see discussion in note 2, supra—and
while also bearing in mind the need to attend to important differences amongst the critics themselves (see, e.g., notes
15, 89 and 90, infra and accompanying text).
5
Claeys, supra note 1 at 618.
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Fully absorbing this point, in turn, would fundamentally recast our understanding of the
“bundle of rights” claim. It is neither merely a descriptive claim about how existing law in fact
treats property rights nor a normative claim about they should be treated, but rather a conceptual
claim about the character of property analysis in any existing or potential legal system.
Finally, each of these components of Hohfeldian analysis—social relations and bundle of
rights—is fundamentally distinct from a third set of points with which they are commonly fused,
concerning the dematerialization of the objects and interests of property. It is the blurring of
what are three distinct lines of analysis—what we may call dephysicalization, disaggregation
and dematerialization—that has led many to the conclusion that Hohfeldian analysis results in
the “disintegration” of property, rendering it no longer a distinct concept or field of law. An
outcome embraced by some (neo-Hohfeldians) and decried by others (neo-Blackstonians).
This conclusion, we believe, is both too hasty and imprecise. Imprecise because it fails to
locate the contest between Hohfeldian and neo-Blackstonian conceptions of property as pivoting
around not one, but at least two and perhaps three, points of contrast, tracking each of the central
but distinct lines of Hohfeldian analysis: dephysicalization, disaggregation and dematerialization.
It is too hasty because the dephysicalization of property, as a social relation, poses no problems;
and while disaggregation and dematerialization may indeed lead to troubling—if very distinct—
forms of disintegration, the fault lies less with the specific content of Hohfeld’s claims than with
a failure, post-Hohfeld, to follow through on his underlying method and structure of analysis in a
constructive fashion. And so the solution to disintegration, we urge, is not a “rethingification” of
property but rather its “reintegration”—by carrying forward the method of Hohfeldian analysis in
two constructive directions: (a) a resource-specific answer to the question of “what is property
about?” and (b) in answer to “what does property consist of?” an architectural analysis of the
basic entitlements that serve as the fundamental building blocks of all property forms.
Our aims in this article are three-fold. First, we provide a somewhat novel distillation of
the central insights and structure of the Hohfeldian analysis of property, and use it to pinpoint the
central fault lines of the contemporary debate in American property theory. Second, we set this
analytical scheme into comparative-historical context, drawing insights from European traditions
of property analysis on the resource-specific character of property entitlements that further enrich
and develop our scheme. Finally, drawing simultaneously on the tools of Hohfeldian analysis
and the lessons of both the American and European debates, we chart two constructive ways
forward for the legal-institutional analysis of property, as social relations regarding resources.
The article is structured in three parts. Part I sets out our distinct view of the fundamental
components and structure of Hohfeldian analysis. Part II then examines what Hohfeld has to
teach Europe and vice versa. Part III points to a way forward with two constructive lessons, each
responding to one of the central perils of disintegration facing Hohfeldian analysis.
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF HOHFELDIAN ANALYSIS

The Hohfeldian analysis of property consists, on our view, of two pairs of distinct but
inter-related conceptual claims, each one leading to the next in a tightly-integrated theoretical
structure. Each discrete claim should on its own seem somewhat familiar, but this may also
prove rather misleading in two respects. First, our treatment of the exact content and implications
of each point, even on its own, often differs from standard understandings among both defenders
and critics (as we indicate in the margins)—in ways that may at first seem subtle but ultimately
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yield very powerful implications.6 Second, in any case what merits special emphasis is our view
of the inter-connection of the claims, specifically of their order of conceptual priority and the
distinct role played by each in the structure of the analysis. 7 The full-blown implications of the
distinct content and structure of our analysis will only emerge at the end, when we deploy it to
clarify the precise fault lines of the debate on “distintegration” and specify where, on our view,
both defenders and critics of Hohfeldian analysis go awry in their understanding of the sources
of the problem and potential ways forward.
(A) Property is a social relation
(1) Social-relationality: A relation between persons regarding things
The beginning of wisdom for Hohfeldian analysis, the foundational claim from which all
others flow, is that property is—always and only—a social relation.8 As Hohfeld goes to great
pains and length to emphasize at the outset of both his 1913 and 1917 articles, property as a legal
concept refers neither to the thing that may be the ultimate object of legal entitlements nor to the
relation of a person to the thing, but rather solely to the relation between persons regarding the
thing.9 To, in other words, a social relation.10
As a legal institution, property always pertains to how two or more persons are related
with respect to a resource: Can one use the resource without another’s interference? Can one
exclude another’s use of it? Can one remain secure against another’s removal of one’s use and
exclusion entitlements? And so forth.11 There is no such thing as property on a desert island with
one person.12 Similarly, contrary to a misunderstanding persisting to the present, “possession” is
simply not an entitlement of property—it denotes a relation between a person and a thing, not

6

This applies even with respect to the pioneering understanding of the discrete claims to which we are most heavily
indebted, that advanced by Professor Joseph Singer. See infra notes 8 and 19, and accompanying text.
7
In this respect, the differences between the view we develop here and that advanced by Professor Singer may be
somewhat greater. See infra notes 16, 17, and 91, and accompanying text.
8
The singular content and centrality of this claim to Hohfeldian analysis merits emphasizing its distinction from
formulations of the point that suggest that property is both a relation between a person and a thing and one between
persons with respect to a thing. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 3 at 6, 10; Carol Rose, Storytelling about Property, 2
YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 37, 40 (1990). For further discussion, see note 20, supra and accompanying text.
9
See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J.
16, 20-28 (1913) (devoting eight pages “[a]t the very outset … to emphasize the importance of differentiating purely
legal relations from the physical and mental facts that call such relations into being.”) Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 720-33 (1917) (devoting
twelve pages to establish his first point, namely that “a right in rem is not a ‘right against a thing.’”).
10
This is not to say that all interpersonal relations are, as such, properly considered “social,” where that term is
taken to impute a “public” rather than “private” character to such relations. However, the relations in question here
are clearly “social” in the requisite sense, for at least two distinct reasons: (a) they are clearly “public” rather than
“private,” in the sense of obtaining between persons who may be perfect strangers, without any prior acquaintance;
and (b) they are “public” in the sense of involving decisions by the state.
11
As Professor Schlag rightly emphasizes, it is not “so much that rights ‘imply’ or ‘give rise’ to duties,” as it is that
“to say that B has a duty towards A” is “exactly what it means to say that A has a right.” Pierre Schlag, How To Do
Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185, 201 (2015).
12
There are, in fact, no legal rights at all in such a situation, but we leave that aside here.
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between persons regarding a thing (that relation is denoted by exclusion).13
The basic import of this claim is of course to guard against the false naturalization of
normative social judgements, by checking against attempts to move straight from descriptions of
physical facts and relations to substantive conclusions of “justice and policy.”14 Other powerful
implications will be elaborated momentarily. Presently, however, the central point we wish to
underline pertains not to its further implications as a stand-alone claim, but to its special status
and role within Hohfeldian analysis—namely, its conceptual character and foundational role.15 It
is not a normative claim about how property rights should be shaped, but rather a positive claim
about what property, as a legal concept and institution, simply is.16 And it lies at the basis of the
13

See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, (A.G. Guest, ed. 1961) (referring
to “the right to possess” as involving “exclusive physical control” over an object); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET. AL,
PROPERTY 81 n.2 (6th ed. 2006) (property consists of “a number of disparate rights, a ‘bundle’ of them: the right to
possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, the right to transfer.”). Ours is not a terminological quibble. In other
words, we recognize of course that in speaking of a “right to possess” one might have clearly in mind that this is not
a matter of “control over” an “object”—i.e., a person-thing relation—but rather precisely about “exclusion of” a
person—i.e., a person-person relation—and hence be making no conceptual error, only using words loosely. But to
speak of a right to “exclusive physical control” over an object is surely to slide into the sorts of conceptual
confusions and normative elisions that Hohfeld was at pains to dispel. And even more clearly: to list a “right to
possess” as part of the “bundle” of property rights alongside rights “to use” and “to exclude” can only evince faulty
conceptualization—robbed of its role as a hazy substitute for the more precise “right to exclude,” the phrase can
only plausibly be taken to mean the flawed notion of a “right of control” over/against a thing, or simply be empty of
meaning (a third possibility—that it is serving as a substitute coverall term for the misleading “right to own” is
foreclosed by the fact that it is precisely “ownership” that is being unbundled by the enumerated rights). See also
Burke Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1932) (in seeking to disambiguate different legal
usages of the term “possession,” focusing primarily on distinguishing between different aspects of person-thing
relations and legal consequences therefrom, while viewing its use to refer to person-person relations in property as
tertiary and irretrievably confused). We thank Henry Smith for drawing our attention to this article.
14
Hohfeld (1913), supra note 9 at 36.
15
It is these—the conceptual character and foundational role of the social-relational claim—that we are at pains to
underline here. In other words our argument is less concerned with what express verbal formulations are used by
scholars when articulating the character of property rights—although some examples of formulations uncertain in
their formal recognition of the social-relational point are given in notes 6, 10, 13 and 14. Rather our concern is with
whether, as a substantive matter, the core lessons of the social-relational claim, its central thrust and powerful
implications, have been fully registered in property theory—and reasons for doubt on this score are given at text
accompanying notes 21 to 29, where we also seek to bring out and drive home these lessons in a systematic way.
This applies even more so to the claim’s foundational role in the overall architectonic of Hohfeldian analysis, the
way it serves as a platform for all other claims, something also not been fully appreciated by either defenders or
critics of the Hohfeldian view as we discuss below. Finally, however, even with respect to its purely verbal
recognition, some scholars do seem expressly to reject the person-person conception of property rights in favor of a
person-thing one, and indeed take this as an important divide internal to the critics of the Hohfeldian conception. See
Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 255 (2011) (“Among scholars who
reject the bundle conception of property, there have been two different and opposing positions. On the one hand, I
and others have sought to recover the earlier concept of property that was buried by the realists, recognizing that it
refers to a specific relationship between someone and something in the world. Thus, the right to property secures a
use-right in, agenda-setting control over, or a sphere of liberty in using this thing (Mossoff 2003; Katz 2008; Claeys
2009). … On the other hand, Tom Merrill and Henry Smith advance an alternative approach to recovering the right
to property. They accept the legal realists’ social conception of rights.”) We thank Oren Bracha for this reference.
16
This is contrast to those who treat the “social relations” claim as a purely normative position—see JOSEPH SINGER
ET. AL, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xlix-1 (2006)—and ever more so to those who, in a
reversal of conceptual priority, see it as building upon the bundle of rights claim rather than vice versa. See Claeys,
supra note 1 at 620.
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Hohfeldian analysis, being the platform upon which all subsequent claims are developed.17
(2) Correlativity: The competing-interests structure of the social relation
The social relations at issue in property are structured by correlative entitlementdisentitlement pairs, whereby an advantage for one person means a disadvantage for another.
One cannot identify an entitlement or benefit for X without a correlative disentitlement or burden
on Y.18 Thus, the social relations of property involve—always and necessarily—pairs of
competing interests.19
Among the implications that follow from this pair of claims, three are central.
“Absolute” ownership is a misnomer, not just normatively contestable. It is commonplace
among those following in Hohfeld’s footsteps to inveigh against an “absolutist” Blackstonian
conception of property on the grounds that it is either undesirable or not descriptive of our
present arrangements—and hence that the entitlements of property ought to be “relative” or
subject to varying limits. However, once we fully internalize the point the property is a social
relation, with correlative/competing entitlements, then the claim that its entitlements ought to be
“qualified” or “relative” is somewhat curious—since there is really no coherent sense to the
notion of “unqualified” or “absolute” entitlements once we understand their relational/correlative
character.20 Once, that is, we fully internalize the social-relational character of property, it is
simply either empty or unclear or incoherent to speak of “absolute” entitlements—the term either
has no or vague meaning or it means “unfettered,” which would involve a case that no jurist has
ever had in mind.21 The point, then, is not really a normative, but rather an elemental, conceptual
one. To challenge absolutist conceptions on normative grounds is to presuppose their analytical
tenability, and to do that is to reinforce unilateral, person-thing, conceptions of property. And the
17

This is in contrast to treatments of the point that fuse it with the bundle of rights claim. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan,
Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism and the Rule of Law, 163 PENN. L. REV. 1889, 1912 (2015). Or that treat it as
simply one of a series of discrete points, and seemingly a secondary one at that, in comparison to the bundle of
rights claim. See SINGER, supra note 3 at 6
18
This point is a distinct further development of the preceding social-relational claim because of course not all
social relations need be so structured around correlative-claims/competing-interests. For instance the teacher-student
relation is an institutionalized, or social, relation that does not have this inherently competing-claims structure.
19
See discussion below, infra Part III at note 95 and accompanying text, of the “Cook/Corbin puzzle” regarding
whether or not the power-liability pair may (sometimes) be an exception to this.
20
To underline this point as clearly as we can, we would go even farther than Professor Singer’s important statement
that “[t]he recognition and exercise of a property right in one person often affects and may even conflict with the
personal or property rights of others,” by dropping his qualifiers. SINGER ET. AL, supra note 16 at x (emphasis
added). This is related to our emphasis above, at note 8 supra, on the distinction between our formulation that
property is always and only a social relation and Professor Singer’s formulation of property as both a relation
between a person and a thing and one between persons with respect to a thing. See SINGER, supra note 3 at 6; and
SINGER ET. AL, supra note 16 supra at x.
21
For X to have unfettered entitlements against all persons with respect to a thing or good would mean that not only
that (a) others had no legitimate interests in that thing or good meriting legal protection, (b) but also that they had no
legitimate interests in other things or goods meriting legal protection, the exercise of which may in some cases come
into conflict with X’s exercise of entitlements pertaining to their thing or good, and (c) finally, that others also had
no other legitimate interests—for instance, in their person—meriting legal protection, which may in some cases
come into conflict with X’s exercise of entitlements in their thing or good. The only actual imaginable case of
“absolute” entitlements, then, is of a person living alone on an island – but in that case they have no property or, for
that matter, any other legal entitlements since all legal entitlements always and only pertain to social relations.
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same holds so for any discussion that emphasizes the “relative” character of property as being a
somehow controversial or “modern” move.22 The only thing modern about it is the explicit
recognition of something that was always inescapable.23
This neatly resolves, then, a long-standing puzzle of contemporary property scholarship:
“was Blackstone was really a Blackstonian?” As a number of scholars including Carol Rose and
Daniel Schorr have argued, in his detailed discussions of the contours of specific property rights
Blackstone did not, in fact, hold to the “absolutism” for which his name has become a by-word
and his “sole and despotic dominion” a catch-phrase.24 On the present analysis not only is this
unsurprising, it is hardly avoidable: since absolutism is simply a misnomer, conceptually not on
the cards, it is hardly surprising that when he turned from abstract declarations to the concrete
specifics of the system, Blackstone simply had to cast aside a view that, whatever its normative
appeal, is simply conceptually untenable—namely, that property is a person-thing relation,
conferring a set of rights that may be enjoyed absolutely—and to register, however implicitly,
the unavoidable reality brought home by any detailed acquaintance with the specifics of property
rights, namely that property is a social relation in which unfettered rights are simply a chimera.25
Property is not a form of “negative liberty.” Both defenders and critics of traditional or
Blackstonian conceptions often accept the premise that these constitute species of “negative
liberty”—with defenders embracing that position and critics urging that in many circumstances
we should normatively go beyond it.26 But this, again, betrays a failure fully to internalize the
relational character of property rights. Negative liberty means the “freedom from” or “absence
of” coercive interference, either of the state or other private individuals. While “positive liberty”
means the “freedom to” effectively pursue one’s ends, via the “presence of” necessary means,
including by way of positive state provision of resources or other assistance. 27 In the case of
property, unless we hew merely to use-privileges—which no participant of this debate has in
mind—then all other entitlements necessarily involve the intervention of the state to burden one
person’s negative liberty for the sake of enforcing another’s entitlements. Moreover, such
enforcement results, directly, in the deprivation of resources. And although the absence of
22

See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1979); ALEXANDER AND DAGAN, supra note 2 at 255.
23
As a striking illustration of this point, think of Roman property. Property scholars and historians long presented it
as the most perfect example of “absolute property,” and only in “modern” times did they admit its relational and
qualified nature. On the view that Roman property was absolute, see PIETRO BONFANTE, LA PROPRIETA’ CORSO DI
DIRITTO ROMANO, vol II, Milano, (1968) p. 327. For the modern view see Eva Jakab, Land, Law and Exploitation of
Natural Resources. Property Rights in Ancient Rome, in LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE ROMAN WORLD,
(P. ERDKAMP, K. VERBOVEN AND A. ZUIDERHOEK eds, Oxford University Press 2015).
24
See Rose, supra note 2; Schorr, supra note 2.
25
Does this mean, then, that the contrast between “Blackstonian” and “Hohfeldian conceptions of property can
simply evaporate, like so much hot air? Not at all. What it does mean is that we have be more precise in specifying
what we might mean by “Blackstonian” in contrast to Hohfeldian views. A central aim of this article is to establish
that this contrast is most usefully understood as operating along three possible axes, as discussed in Part I.C below.
26
See PENNER, supra note 4 at 50; Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1560 (2003).
27
To be more accurate, these are the common meanings attributed to the terms in contemporary political theory. Yet
it bears noting that in the foundational modern discussion of the terms, Isaiah Berlin himself oscillates between this
contrast and a fundamentally different one, in which “negative liberty” denotes the freedom to pursue one’s own
ends—via both the absence of coercive interference and the presence of positive means—while “positive liberty”
denotes the freedom to ensure that one’s ends are truly one’s own, what might be better called self-determination,
along with perhaps that one’s ends are “objectively” valuable. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958),
reprinted in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, at 166, 170-72 (Henry Hardy ed., 2d ed. 2002)
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resources is typically thought to be a deficit only in “positive” rather than “negative” liberty, the
point is that such deficits in positive liberty may stem directly from state action and not, as is
commonly thought, only from state inaction.28 The persistent assimilation of “the right to
property” as among the species of “negative” rights/liberty is another tell-tale sign of the failure
fully to absorb the relational character of property.
We hasten to add—to forestall a third misunderstanding—that the conceptual point that
property is a social relation does not by itself settle any normative questions. In particular, it does
not automatically issue in the normative claim that property must have a “social function” or
serve the “social interest,” where these are taken to mean a “public interest” in contrast to private
ones.29 Or, in a related vein, in the conclusion that we have somehow ruled out justifications for
property entitlements based on “natural rights” arguments of for instance labor/desert, autonomy
or personhood. What the social relational claim does do, however, is press upon such—indeed,
all—normative justifications the need for an explicit shift in frame: away from a unilateral focus
on a given person and their activities and interests and toward forthrightly taking up the bilateral
character of the question, involving as it always does contending claims.30
It bears emphasis that to this point nothing has been said of property as a bundle of rights.
(B) Property is a bundle of rights
From the first two foundational claims, that (a) property is a social relation (b) having a
correlative/competing-interests structure, flow out the next two claims, subsumable under the
distinct heading of “property is a bundle of rights.”
(1) Divisibility: Distinct Pairs of Competing Interests = Distinct Entitlements
Precisely because any given entitlement of property entails a disentitlement for someone
else, and hence implicates competing interests, we must be careful not to conflate distinct pairs
of competing interests under the cover of some single umbrella term (be it “property” or “right”
or “ownership”). Thus: (a) It is one thing to protect Jill’s interest in the use of a space by not
conferring on Jack any entitlement to exclude Jill from accessing the space. (b) It is another thing
entirely also to entitle Jill to prevent Jack from using the space as well, by conferring upon Jill
the entitlement to exclude access. (c) And it is a third thing altogether to confer upon Jill the
entitlement to prevent Jack from engaging in a noisy activity outside, in a neighboring space, that
interferes with Jill’s “quiet enjoyment” of the first space. Each of these cases implicates distinct
kinds of competing interests. And, so, the entitlements of property are best understood not as
28

Indeed, in what is commonly seen as the touchstone essay on this topic—and the one serving Professor Penner as
the source for his claim at supra note 26—Isaiah Berlin in fact recognized a version of this Hohfeldian/legal-realist
point. Namely that, once we register the pervasive role of the state in structuring the “background conditions” of the
private sphere, the realm of “negative liberty” infringements expands dramatically—attenuating the conceptual and
normative significance of the contrast between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” to the point of replacing it with an
alternative distinction, between a freedom of means and a freedom of ends, or freedom as voluntariness and
effective agency versus freedom as self-determination. See BERLIN, supra note 27 at 170-72..
29
For examples of this blurring, see note 72, infra and accompanying text.
30
For an illustrative example of the extent and depth of the difficulties meeting this requirement can pose for natural
rights arguments, in this case of Lockean stripe, see G.A. Cohen, Nozick on Appropriation, I/150 NEW LEFT REV. 89
(1985).
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consisting of only one or a necessarily unified aggregate, but, rather, a divisible “bundle.”
This “divisibility” of ownership into discrete sets of entitlement-disentitlement pairs is of
course the most familiar, indeed well-worn, theme of Hohfeldian analysis, going by the name of
“disaggregation.” Less well appreciated, however, is the difference between a formal verus a
purposive approach to the drawing of Hohfeldian distinctions. Illustrative of the former is an
example commonly used—across a century of Hohfeld reception—to convey the distinction
between a privilege and a claim-right: the case of having merely an “exclusion-privilege” with
respect to a piece of land, without an “exclusion-right” regarding the same.31 Yet conferral of an
exclusion-privilege without the corresponding right, while certainly a formal possibility, is, we
suggest, also merely a formal one, one having little sense or purpose in most real-world contexts
we might be interested in. And the upshot of drawing up such formally possible, but practically
inert, options is, we believe, a tendency for the meaning and point of Hohfeldian analysis to
become lost in the mists of the ad-hoc proliferation of logical variations without end.32
A purposive approach, by contrast, provides a controlling orientation to the elaboration of
the distinctions, showing clearly their point by grounding them in real-world issues involving
policy-relevant distinctions between competing interests.33 Take for example the distinctions
elucidated in the previous paragraph: Our first distinction, between a use-privilege and an
exclusion-right, is of signal importance in the context of resources susceptible to nonrival uses.
Meanwhile the latter distinction, between a use-privilege and a use-right is of course central to
the historical development of nuisance law,34 in which context the latter claim—being applied to
neighboring or conflicting uses— is in fact better understood as converting a use-privilege over
one’s own resource into a distinct exclusion-right, now over a neighbor’s (use of their) resource.
Purposively grounding the analysis of divisibility in this way provides, we believe, an important
first safeguard against the slide of disaggregation into “disintegration.”35
31

See Arthur Corbin, Foreword, in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 8 (Walter
Wheeler Cook, ed. 1919); and Pierre Schlag, How To Do Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 185,
202-03 (2015).
32
We should emphasize that neither Professors Corbin nor Schlag endorse such a formalistic approach to Hohfeld—
indeed, both go to pains explicitly to underline the practical or policy significance of his analysis, which we build
upon here. See Corbin, id. at xi; Schlag, id. at 189, 191-92. Our point however is that the use of examples such as
exclusion-privilege versus exclusion-right to illustrate Hohfeldian distinctions partially undermines their own
pioneering insistence on a practical or purposive, as opposed to a pure or formalist, approach to Hohfeldian analysis.
33
This is one of two ways in which the view we are advancing here differs from the standard understanding of the
Hohfeldian analysis of “the bundle of rights” as a “purely analytic” approach. On this view, Hohfeld’s analysis is
taken to be both “pure” in the sense of “formal,” and “analytic” in the sense of “atomistic.” By contrast, we take the
method underlying Hohfeld’s analysis to be purposive rather than “formal”—as discussed here—and in contrast to
“atomistic,” relational, as discussed in notes 91-94, infra and accompanying text.
34
See, e.g., Robert Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1101 (1986).
35
To be sure, simply grounding the analysis of divisibility in purposes is hardly an elixir against the perils of
disintegration. Indeed, Professor Smith has argued that it is precisely a purposivity run amuck that leads the “bundle
of rights” approach to an untenable ad-hocery. Smith, supra note at 1719-20. But as we discuss below, Professor
Smith’s argument here runs together what for present purposes we seek to keep importantly distinct, namely: the
case for conceptual parsimony in devising a theory of property versus the case for institutional parsimony in
devising or evaluating real-world property arrangements. See notes 88 and 89, infra and accompanying text. Bearing
that in mind, our argument here is simply that a purposive approach to the analysis of disaggregation—i.e., of
divisibility and, discussed next, of variability—is an important first step in checking against conceptual ad-hocery
(not, to be sure, the last step, as we elaborate below). This leaves open, as a matter for further substantive inquiry,
the question of “how much” divisibility we should actually countenance in real-world property architectures—that
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(2) Variability: Distinct Contexts = Distinct Shapes for a Given Entitlement
An extension of the preceding point—one meriting singling out—is that not only may the
conferral of discrete entitlements upon distinct persons sensibly vary by purpose and context
(divisibility), but so may the shape of each discrete entitlement—in terms of its existence (should
it be conferred at all?), content (which activities should it cover?), holders (who and how many
should enjoy it?) and enforcement (what remedy for its violation?). Highlighting this serves to
guard against a tendency to take the content of the distinct entitlements as fixed, and thus to limit
our understanding of the malleability of the bundle of rights to sub-dividing and reshuffling fixed
sticks among different holders, as opposed also to including re-shaping of the sticks themselves.
The content of these claims about the “disaggregation”—or divisibility and variability—
of the entitlements of property are, again, the most familiar components of Hohfeldian analysis,
squarely falling within the “bundle of rights” rubric. What is less well recognized is an important
point about their status. The “bundle of rights” claim is not merely a descriptive assertion about
the shape taken by existing legal arrangements (i.e., that they often do unbundle or disaggregate
“ownership”) nor just a normative exhortation about what shape they should take. Rather, it is a
conclusion drawn out of the social-relational claim: once we register that each entitlement is a
social relation involving a pair of competing interests, then when distinct pairs of interests are
involved it would simply be a mistake of logic and practical reason—in terms of transparency in
the process of reasoning and cogency in its substance—to treat a decision on one pair of interests
as the same as, or controlling, a decision on a distinct pair. In a word, then, the bundle of rights
claim is neither a descriptive nor a normative claim regarding the specific content of existing or
desirable legal arrangements; rather, it is a conceptual claim about what the analysis of property
must involve in any legal system.
When, however, the claim of disaggregation is advanced in isolation of its underlying
basis in the social-relational claim and in a manner delinked from its driving purpose—to ensure
careful consideration of meaningfully significant distinctions in interests—it threatens to spin out
into an endless proliferation of formally possible (even if practically inert) entitlement options, or
devolve into a laundry-list taxonomy of the fine-grained details of various and sundry existing
arrangements. To threaten, in a word, disintegration.
(C) Dereification ≠ “Disintegration”
Does Hohfeldian analysis tend toward the disintegration of property—emptying it of any
distinguishing features as a concept or field of law—as declaimed by some and decried by
others?36 On our view it need not: with the foregoing understanding of its content and structure
in place, Hohfeldian analysis both can and should avoid the fate of disintegrating property. But
to do so requires, first, disentangling a series of intricate conceptual wrangles that frequently
will no doubt depend on our sense of the balance of considerations such as the pursuit of substantive policy purposes
versus administrability, information costs, and so forth, as these play out in the context of different sorts of resources
(with the drawing of distinctions between resources being subject to a parallel set of conceptual and substantive
considerations, as discussed in Part III.A below). Whatever the outcome of such specific substantive inquiries, we
remain steadfast in our view that, as an analysis of property’s general form, “divisibility” as expounded here is
(along with variability, discussed next) the proper conceptual upshot of Hohfeldian “disaggregation” analysis.
36
See Vandevelde, supra note 22; Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); Penner, supra note 1; Smith, supra note 4.
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obstruct received understandings of the central dimensions of Hohfeldian analysis and of what is
at stake in its disintegration. Unpacking these is the task of the present section. Its upshot is the
need to supplement Hohfeldian analysis with two constructive developments—absent in the
original scheme but true to its spirit—which we sketch in Part III.
(1) Dereification = Dephysicalization + Disaggregation + Dematerialization
To the core components of Hohfeldian analysis just elucidated may be added a third pair
of distinct points, concerning the dematerialization of both the objects and the interests of
property, as follows:
Social relations: (a) property denotes neither a thing nor a relation between a person and
a thing, but a relation between persons with respect to a thing; (b) the social relation consists of
legal entitlement-disentitlement pairs that simultaneously benefit the interests of some and
burden the interests of others with respect to the thing; and (c) dematerialization of objects:
finally, the things themselves, that are the object of the social relations, needn’t be tangible but
may take intangible form, such as with inventive practical ideas or creative forms of expression.
Bundle of Rights: the entitlements of property are multiple, divisible and variable: (a) not
just a single one nor a necessarily unified package; (b) nor uniform or invariant in their discrete
content; and (c) dematerialization of interests: the interests protected by the discrete entitlements
needn’t be concretely “physical” like “consumptive use,” but may take increasingly “abstract”
form, such as expected monetary value.
Two points are fundamental to establish with respect to how dematerialization relates to
the core components of Hohfeldian analysis. First, as a long line of scholars has emphasized, as a
matter of historical development the practices and insights associated with dematerialization
likely proved crucial catalysts for the crystallization of the core social-relations and bundle-ofrights claims.37 They did so by helping to “dereify” thinking about property, by making plainly
unavailable—in the case of intangible objects or very abstract interests—reliance on any physical
attributes, relations or activities as the sole basis of legal decisions.38 However, and second, it
must also be clearly borne in mind that notwithstanding its historical stimulus, dematerialization
is not only distinct from the relational and bundle claims but of secondary significance in the
Hohfeldian scheme. Indeed, the order of conceptual priority is the reverse of historical sequence:
not only do the relational and bundle claims, once we’ve grasped them, not stand or fall with
dematerialization, they are also more deeply secure, conceptual, claims. Dematerialization, by
37

See Vandevelde, supra note 22; Grey, id; Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960 (1992); Jane B. Barron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 UNIV. CINCI. L. REV. 57
(2014).
38
Illustrative here is Fredrick Pollock’s path-breaking treatment of these issues, lying at the center of the historical
process of dematerialization. Pollock’s argument that to be a “thing” in law, an object of property needn’t have any
physical properties, has precisely the upshot of underlining that legal conceptualizations and decisions pertaining to
such “things” must explicitly advert to underlying human interests and social purposes—and that this also holds for
physical things, with the line of reasoning forced upon us with special clarity by dematerialization now reaching
back also to apply to material objects. See Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318, 320 (1894) (“At
this point it may be worth considering, at the risk of an apparent paradox, whether corporeal things are themselves
so corporeal as we think at first. For a material object is really nothing to law, whatever it may be to science or
philosophy, save as an occasion of use or enjoyment to man, or as an instrument in human acts”). We thank Henry
Smith for urging the significance of Pollock’s analysis in this connection. For reliance on Pollock’s argument as a
basis for the “rethingification” of the objects of property in a post-dematerialization world, see note 79 infra.
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contrast, is more contingent in two respects: (a) its validity hinges upon specific historical
developments in technology, culture and economic practices; and (b) even today, we could
choose not to consider various intangible objects and abstract interests as adjacent conceptually
or normatively to tangible and physical ones, for purposes of organizing fields of law or making
substantive decisions. The relational and bundle claims, on the other hand, are bedrock.
Unfortunately, likely as a result of their historical intertwinement, the radically distinct
character and content of these three dimensions of analysis has often been missed. Starting with
Arthur Corbin at the onset of the reception of Hohfeld and continuing to the present, a persistent
tendency for both defenders and critics of Hohfeldian analysis has been to blur these distinct
lines of analysis: not only to conflate the dematerialization of interests with that of objects but
also, more fundamentally, to lump in both with the relational claim (often under cover of the
umbrella term “dephysicalization”), or even to drop the latter out of the picture altogether.39 The
problems created by such blurring are manifold: The fundamental content and character of the
relational claim—as the platform for all Hohfeldian analysis—gets lost from view, robbing in
turn the disaggregation claim of any underlying basis, setting it loose as a free-floating claim of
uncertain provenance or status. The result—once we add in how the dematerialization of the
objects and interests of property is conflated with its “dephysicalization” as wrought by the
relational claim40—is to render entirely opaque the precise bases for neo-Hohfeldian claims of
“disintegration” and the specific targets of the neo-Blackstonians’ critical fire.
In general, the distinctive power and components of Hohfeldian analysis, with its clear
delineation of distinct lines of analysis, alongside their relations of conceptual priority—to form
a tightly-integrated and generative structure—are displaced by a series of now laundry-listed,
now jumbled together, claims. All either to herald or decry a hazy “disintegration” whose distinct
sources and perils become harder and harder to specify or repair.
Specifically, talk of a single contrast between “right to a thing” versus “bundle of rights”
41
views obscures (when it doesn’t simply conflate) three distinct dimensions of the Hohfeldian
view that neo-Blackstonian critics may mean to target and replace with a “rethingification”
alternative: (a) the dephysicalization of property, meaning the account of property as a social
relation; (b) the disaggregation of the entitlements of property into a divisible and variable set; or
(c) the dematerialization of the objects and interests of property entitlements. Comprehensive
exploration of which of these targets different critics have in mind—and of the cogency of their

39

In perhaps the leading discussion in this vein, Kenneth Vandevelde under the heading of the “dephysicalization”
of property focuses exclusively on what we call here “dematerialization,” which he then couples with disaggregation
to form the two central insights of Hohfeldian analysis—with the crucially distinct, and more foundational, socialrelational point dropped out of sight entirely.Vandevelde supra note 22, at 334-40, 360-2. See similarly Grey, supra
note 36; HORWITZ, supra note 37 at 145-156. For other receptions blurring together the claims—and, crucially,
burying the relational claim and its foundational status—see Arthur Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock
Exchange, 31 YALE L. J. 429 (1922); Penner, supra note 1; Stephen Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Hold On to His
Collection of Sticks, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 265 (2011); Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8
ECON. J. WATCH 279 (2011); ALEXANDER AND DAGAN, supra 2 (2012), and Barron, supra note 37.
40
We hasten to add that it is our use of these terms that is idiosyncratic. Standardly, “dephysicalization” is used as
synonymous with what we prefer to give the distinct label of the “dematerialization” of the objects and interests of
property. See Vandevelde, id. and HORWITZ, id. “Dephysicalization” we prefer to reserve for the radically distinct,
and more fundamental, idea of denoting a relational rather than thing or person-thing conception of property.
41
See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 1 at (speaking of “the […] contrast” between a “thing versus ad hoc bundle” views)
(emphasis added).
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criticisms and merits of their proposed alternatives—lies beyond our present scope.42 Here, it
suffices to emphasize that clarity about these distinct lines of analysis is simply the indispensable
first step—both for specifying the precise concerns posed by disintegration and for developing
constructive ways forward. In what follows, we focus on advancing our own views along these
two fronts, while touching briefly in the margins on how these relate to neo-Hohfeldian
disintegration views and the rethingification responses of neo-Blackstonian critics.43
(2) Disintegration = Unmooring dematerialization + Unspooling disaggregation
To begin at the end, so to speak, the way out of disintegration starts by breaking down
the question—“what is property?”—into two distinct lines of inquiry: (a) What is property
about? That is, what differentiates property, as a concept or field, from other areas of law in
terms of its distinctive subject matter? and (b) What does property consist of? That is, what are
the central legal entitlements that can provide the organizing focal points for positive, normative
and institutional analysis of the field?44
With the questions so framed, does Hohfeldian analysis provide clear, non-disintegrative,
answers? Yes and no. On the one hand, nothing in the social relations claim prevents us from
offering a relatively clear and distinct answer to the first question: property is the field of law
pertaining to “social relations with respect to things.” Of course this answer does face difficulties
on a Hohfeldian view, but what is important to recognize is that these difficulties stem not from
the social relations or “dephysicalization” claim, but, rather, from a set of further insights—those
pertaining to the dematerialization of the objects and interests of property. These insights, by
loosing property from the anchor of “things,” threatens to unmoor the field, robbing it of any
firm grounding in a distinctive subject matter. The task, then, is how to avoid this “unmooring”
of the field, while retaining the core insight that property is, indeed, a field of social relations
about … what? Our answer, developed in what follows, is: neither everything and hence nothing
in particular (disintegration), nor a re-assertion of things (rethingification) but, rather, resources.
Concerning the second question—of what entitlements does property consist?—here the
difficulty with the core of Hohfeldian analysis is greater. Under the heading of disaggregation,
42

One of us is presently engaged in such a comprehensive examination, as part a fuller treatment of many of the
topics addressed in more abbreviated form in this essay. Talha Syed, The Architecture of Property: Structure and
Purpose in Hohfeldian Analysis (draft manuscript on file with the authors).
43
See notes 44, 77, 79, and 88-89, infra and accompanying text.
44
These are not of course the only ways to frame the inquiry. Indeed, part of our argument concerns the advantages
of this particular framing—one that flows directly out of our understanding of the structure and purpose of
Hohfeld’s own enterprise—over alternatives. As an illustrative contrast, consider Professor Grey’s influential
discussion of disintegration, framing the issue in terms of the following two questions: First, what does ownership
consist of? Second, what can one have property rights “in”? Grey, id. at 69-70. (A similar frame is adopted in
Vandevelde, supra note 22.) From our vantage, this way of approaching the issues bears two significant drawbacks.
First, to consider the ownership question first-—before and in isolation of the issue of “ownership of what”—is
precisely to put the cart before the horse. On our—purposive—view of concept-formation, one cannot even begin to
answer what ownership may, does, or should consist of unless we first have an idea of what property is about (and
thus what may be “owned”). Second, to inquire into what one can have property rights “in” is a quite distinct matter
from asking what property is about. The latter formulation directs our attention precisely to the task at hand: namely,
to conceptualize an institution or field in light of some sense of our governing purposes, the cognitive and practical
interests at stake. The former question, on the other hand, invites not only a purely descriptive inquiry into existing
legal practices but also one that takes their surface terminology at conceptual face value—so that whenever the term
“property” is invoked by legal professionals, we simply accept that the relevant underlying concept is in play.
Thereby disabling us, right at the outset, from developing any theoretically powerful conceptualizations.

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710102

travel a pair of conceptual insights regarding the divisibility and variability of entitlements but
little idea of what they mean going forward. Are there any “core” or central entitlements to serve
as focal points of analysis, or does disaggregation simply “unspool” into a laundry list of discrete
entitlements, devolving into ad-hoc analysis of piecemeal decisions taken up one at a time? The
latter peril would seem to loom especially large where, as discussed above, the analysis of
entitlements is not grounded in any controlling purposes. And one possible grounding—that the
entitlements pertain to “things”—is, again, made unavailable by dematerialization. The first step,
then, in avoiding unspooling is to anchor the analysis of property’s entitlements in an analysis of
its distinctive subject matter, resources. A second step—equally necessary—is to structure the
analysis of the entitlements themselves in a more conceptually integrated manner. We advance a
way of doing so in Part III.B. below, by developing a picture of property as consisting neither of
anything (disintegration), nor one single thing (a “core” or “essence”) but rather an architecture
of elemental entitlements, the fundamental building blocks of all property forms.
II.

AN AUTONOMOUS TRADITION OF PROPERTY ANALYTICS IN EUROPE: RESOURCESPECIFIC PROPERTY DISAGGREGATION

The revised Hohfeldian analytical scheme that we have just outlined highlights the contextual
and, as we will develop, resource-specific character of property. Property, we argue, is a legal
relation between persons with respect to “things” (resources), a relation structured by correlative
legal entitlement-disentitlement pairs, in which the conferral and shape of any particular
entitlement depends on context and purpose—more precisely, we will argue, on the distinct
interests and values implicated by distinct kinds of resources. The focus on the “thing” was
marginal to Hohfeld himself and intentionally dropped in neo-Hohfeldian dematerialization
accounts, in which property became unmoored, so as to no longer be anchored in anything. But
the resource-specific character of property was central to an autonomous tradition of property
disaggregation developed in Continental Europe. It is to this tradition that we now turn, with the
aim of retrieving its fundamental insights and illustrating the main stages in its development.
(A) The Roman “Law of Things” and the contextualist focus on resources
As is often the case when one seeks to understand continental European property law, we
have to start with Roman law.45 Our search for the European Hohfelds takes us back to the late
Republic, a time of great juristic creativity, when the main features of Roman law as we know it
today took shape.46 Roman property has long struck the imagination not only of lawyers but also
of historians, economists and philosophers because of its allegedly “absolute”, “individualistic”,
“unitary”, “extremely concentrated” nature.47 This idea of Roman dominium being absolute and
45

For a relatively recent discussion of the importance of grounding the study of European property law in its
Roman and medieval past see George L. Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches
und internationales Privatrecht, Bd. 71, H. 4 (Oktober 2007), pp. 802-851.
46
H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3rd edition,
Cambridge University Press, 1972, reprint 2008) at 5.
47
A quick glance at Roman law textbooks reveals the ubiquitous presence of the idea that Roman property is absolute
and unitary. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS supra, at 140 (arguing that “The Roman law of classical times, -a leading
textbook reads- is dominated by what is commonly called the absolute conception of ownership” defined as “the
unrestricted right of control over a physical thing”); W. W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND
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unitary is a pervasive one and its traces in the modern philosophical, economic and legal
literature on property are ubiquitous. But, as Italian Roman law scholar Vittorio Scialoja put it, it
is a legend.48 This legend was concocted by the “Romano-Bourgeois” jurists, the liberal jurists
who, in the nineteenth century, sought to construct a modern, individualistic property law for
liberal, capitalist European nation states along the lines of Roman dominium. The truth is that
Roman property law was less “absolute” and “individualistic” and “unitary” than the RomanBourgeois jurists would have us believe.49 And, moreover, dominium was just one the many
forms of ownership available in Roman law. It was the supreme form of ownership, reserved to
Roman citizens, exempt from taxation and protected through the action known as rei vindicatio,
which was a formal assertion of absolute title.50 However, alongside dominium, there existed a
large menu of more limited and differently shaped forms of “ownership” that were largely
“resource-specific”, i.e. tailored on the specific characteristics of and interests implicated by
different resources.
The contextual focus on resources is a critical feature of Roman property law that has
attracted scant attention in contemporary property law literature. Roman jurists developed a
highly sophisticated “law of things”, i.e. a classification of the various types of res that can be
the object of property rights. Roman law, classified the various res according to their physical
characteristics, the economic and social policy interests they involved and the moral and cultural
values they implicated. In modern property law, the most familiar and fundamental distinctions
are that between real property and personal property, and between private property and public
property. But these two sets of categories were marginal to the Roman law of things. For the
Romans, the critical distinction was that between res in commercio and res extra commercium.51
The former were things that can be the object of private property, while the latter were things
that, because of the social, moral or cultural values associated with them, cannot be the object of
private property and of market transactions. The res extra commercium were further divided in
res (extra commercium) divini iuris which could not be privately owned and exchanged because
of their religious significance and res (extra commercium) humani iuris which were exempted
from private property and commerce because they implicated important public interests. Among
the things that were exempt from private property and market transactions because of the public
interest they involved, particularly important were the res communes. 52 These were things like
the sun, the air, the sea, the shores, that are given to all as an essential, innate gift and hence
COMMON LAW (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition 1952, reprint 2008) at 81-82 (arguing that the owner has very
limited ability to parcel out to other individuals these three entitlements, in the way, in the Anglo-American common
law and that this limited ability makes property a “unitary” or “concentrated” right).
48
VITTORIO SCIALOJA, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO ROMANO, (1885) (The Roman theory of property has inspired the
strangest legends not only among the populace but also, sometimes, among the educated).
49
Eva Jakab, Land, Law and Exploitation of Natural Resources. Property Rights in Ancient Rome, in LAND AND
NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE ROMAN WORLD, (P. ERDKAMP, K. VERBOVEN AND A. ZUIDERHOEK eds, Oxford
University Press 2015).
50
PIETRO BONFANTE, LA PROPRIETA’. CORSO DI DIRITTO ROMANO, vol II, Milano, (1968) p 327.
51
See Yan Thomas, Le Valeur des Choses. Le Droit Romain hors la Religion, in ANNALES, HISTOIRE, SCIENCES
SOCIALES 57 annee N6 nov-dec 2002 pp 1431-1462 (arguing that by classifying things into res in commercio and
res extra commercium, the Romans marked off a separate realm, that of the sacred, the religious and the public,
which are seen as contiguous and very close to each other).
52
The list of res communes is in JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, (translated and with an introduction by Peter Birks and Grant
McLeod, Cornell Univeristy Press, 1987), book II, 2.1 de rerum divisione; on the debate on the nature and significance
of the concept or res communes see, Bonfante, La Proprieta’, supra note, p.55.
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belong not to the state but to the public, who has a temporary and limited, but legally protected,
right to access and use. Another critical category was that of res mancipi, things that had critical
socio-economic value, the transfer of which required specific, highly ritualized modalities
capable of ensuring certainty and publicity in economic transactions.53 Yet another distinction,
largely opaque to us because rooted in Stoic physics, was that between res unitae (single things,
infused with one single breath of pneuma, the world soul ), res compositae (composite things),
and universitates rerum (totalities of things).
For each of these res, the owner’s entitlements were shaped to reflect the special interests and
values implicated by the resource. The characteristics of the resource determined (a) which
entitlements were conferred to the owner (b) the scope of the owner’s entitlements; (c) whether
these entitlements were exclusive or shared with others. This contextualist focus on resources
meant that, alongside dominium, the supreme and full (even if never “absolute”) form of
ownership, Roman law allowed for a wide menu of more limited forms of ownership for specific
resources that were critical for the Empire’s economic, military and political needs. For example,
land situated in the provinces of the Empire was a critical resource for both economic and geopolitical reasons. Accordingly, property entitlements were split between the Roman state and
private “owners” or users and shaped to achieve a variety of goals. The vast literature on the
Roman province of Egypt gives us a good sense of what some of these goals and policies were.
By recognizing “ownership” bundles with different scope and shape, the Roman state sought to
balance two, largely conflicting, goals: advancing the economic power and political influence of
the Empire’s landowning elite and securing significant stable state revenues in the long term.54
Another reason for the state to retain control on provincial lands was the role it played as an
economic actor, deciding what crops would be planted and, for example, subsidizing the
production of wheat by leasing wheat land on favorable terms.55 Another specially tailored form
of ownership was ownership of “ager publicus”, i.e., land situated in Italy, for which the state
retained title while granting private users entitlements that, with time, came to resemble
“ownership”. The content and scope of users’ entitlements were shaped to encourage the
establishment of large-scale commercial farming at a time when a Mediterranean market
economy was developing.56
(B) The Medieval Concept of “dominim divisum”
While these more limited forms of resource-specific property were central to Rome’s social
and economic life, they were never explicitly theorized or conceptualized. Roman legal thought
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was eminently practical and disinclined to offer abstract definitions.57 Modern jurists have
painstakingly searched for the definition of the concept of property in the Roman sources, but
none of the many supposed definitions they found can hardly be considered the definition. For a
conceptualization of property able to accommodate these more limited forms of resource-specific
ownership we have to wait for the 14th century, when the jurists known as the “Glossators” and
the “Commentators” were busy developing a property law functionally suited to the socioeconomic and political needs of their own world, medieval society, using Roman materials.58
This task required conceptual creativity as well as pragmatic awareness of the problems and
needs of the real, actual life of property law. It is to the creativity and pragmatism of one of the
most prominent “Commentators”, Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1313-1357), that we owe dominium
divisum, a new concept of property informed by two fundamental intuitions that today we
associate with Hohfeld: (a) that property consists of analytically distinct entitlements and (b) that
each entitlement in the bundle is variable, i.e., its very existence, scope and the number of its
holders can vary without property losing its “propertiness”. The concept of dominium divisum
describes a type of property in which the distinct entitlements that ownership comprises were
split between two “owners”, who have respectively “dominium directum” and “dominium utile”.
While, roughly, the former had formal title, the right to receive some form of rent and the right to
transfer title and the latter had the right to use, to appropriate the revenue generated by the
property and the duty to pay rent, the specific shape and scope of the two owners’ entitlements
varied. In each of the property forms that Bartolus conceptualized as instances of dominium
divisum, i.e. feudal tenure, emphyteusis, superficies, and the long term prescription (longi
temporis praescriptio), the two owners’ bundles were differently shaped and yet they were still
“dominium”, thereby emphasizing the malleability of property.59
Why Bartolus felt the need to finally formulate a concept of variable and divided ownership,
the absence of which had not precluded the development of a sizable menu of forms of divided,
resource-specific ownership in Roman times, is a fascinating question. The answer we suggest is
that the structure and the daily lived experience of medieval society made medieval jurists
uniquely aware of the fundamental insight in which any concept of variable and divided property
is rooted, i.e., that property is a social relation, a relation between persons concerning a resource.
Crafting a new concept of dominium divisum, consisting of analytically distinct entitlements each
of which can be variously shaped, requires abandoning any abstract notion that property is a
thing or a physical relation between a person and a thing and realizing that property, always and
inevitably, involves relations between persons. The Roman political and cultural imaginary,
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largely shaped by Roman “Classical Law”, obscured the web of social relations regarding
resources; instead it spotlighted the relation between two poles of power, strong private property,
conceived in very abstract terms, and a well-developed central state.60 The disintegration of the
Roman state ushered in a feudal structure in which everyone, feudal lords, vassals and serfs, is
tied up in hierarchical relations regarding access to land. Feudalism forced medieval jurists to
abandon abstractions and to realize that property is about hierarchies and complex webs of social
relations.61 Of course it would be anachronistic to expect medieval jurists explicitly to crystallize
their intuitions into an articulate conceptualization of property as a social relation. However, in
avoiding the anachronism, we should also not fail to see how, in retrospect, their development of
the concept of dominium divisum was, indeed, rooted in glimmers of this realization.
Dominium divisum was the general conceptual category to describe the many, feudal and
non-feudal, property forms that involved a relation between a “superior” owner and an “inferior”
owner regarding access to a parcel of land. In each of the many property forms that belonged to
the larger category of dominium divisum, ownership entitlements were differently shaped so as to
structure different types of relations between the two owners with regards to the land. In some
forms, the relation between the two owners was social and political, with the superior owner
entitled to receive homage, military aid and to exercise a variety of jurisdictional rights and
recreational privileges.62 Other forms of dominium divisum were largely economic in character
and resembled today’s lease, with entitlements shaped to give the parties different degrees of
control over the management and profits of the land.63 In other words, medieval jurists felt the
need to develop the concept of dominium divisum when faced with the new reality of feudal
society, in which people were immersed in a complex web of political, social and economic
relations with regards to land. The new concept of property as dominium divisum allowed the
jurists to describe the new reality and to acknowledge and embrace their role as the technicians
who shaped ownership entitlements to achieve a variety of political, social and economic goals.
Practically, articulating the new concept required overcoming a number of major conceptual
difficulties, such as the Roman rule that explicitly rules out the possibility of two owners for the
same thing.64 But Bartolus and his contemporaries were ready to bend and twist the Roman rules
60
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because the abstraction of Roman absolute dominium had lost its descriptive power. The new
feudal world required a new property methodology that married the need for conceptual
systematization with close sociological attention to the variety of relations between individuals
regarding land.
(C) The Concept of Property as a Tree
The Roman “law of things” and the concept of dominium divisum introduced into European
property thought the awareness that property, rather than being a monolithic right, involves a
number of distinct and limited entitlements, each of which may be shaped and divided to best
promote the values and interests implicated by the different resources that are the object of
property. Dominium divisum continued to be an accurate description of landownership in
continental Europe throughout the early modern era. However, starting in the 18th century, as
feudal property relations transformed and economic and political modernity started taking shape,
dominium divisum and the forcus on the resource lost their descriptive usefulness and their appeal.
By the 18th century, landholding relations throughout Europe had fundamentally transformed, with
a gradual but steady shift in the socio-economic and legal status of “superior” and “inferior”
“owners”.65 The bond between the “superior” owner and the land became increasingly tenuous
while the bond between the “inferior” owner and the land grew stronger. One of the fundamental
ideas of political and economic modernity was to transform medieval, limited “inferior” ownership
into full-blown ownership.66 Jurists, economists and philosophers embarked in the project of
crafting “Roman-Bourgeois” property, a new concept of unitary and full property for modern,
liberal, capitalist European nation states, modeled along the lines of Roman dominium. The jurists
did the conceptual groundwork, while the economists developed a new political economy that
praised the economic and civic-republican benefits of absolute property67, and political theorists
proposed a new constitutional vision of equal citizenship based on the demarcation between
absolute private property and public sovereignty.68 At the dawn of the 19th century, absolute and
unitary property was enshrined in the Code Napoleon.69 And, in the decades between the
Bourgeois Monarchy of Loius Philippe and the end of the 19th century, French jurists completed
the work, interpreting the Code’s property in light of the mandates of liberal individualism,
Roman texts. The Lex Possessores (C.11, 62,12), a late constitution included in Justinian’s compilation, described
the holders of a right of emphyteusis as “owners of the land” (fundorum domini). And yet, according to another text,
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Bartolus concludes, then the types of ownership must be different, because the same ownership cannot belong to two
persons as stated in the Digest (D 13.6.5.15). See Rufner, supra note 46 at 131 and 139-141.
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effectively transforming it into full blown Roman Bourgeois property.70 Charles Bonaventure
Marie Touiller, the author of one of the most influential “commentaries” on the Code Napoleon,
captured the essence of Roman-Bourgeois property in one brief sentence that seems a direct
refutation of any Hohfeldian insight: “property is the relation between a person and a thing
irrespectively of all others”.71
Roman Bourgeois property was the dominant conceptualization of property throughout the
19th century. Classical liberal jurists and their social critics engaged in a close debate over its
conceptual accuracy, its policy implications and its moral foundations. The latter exposed the
unrealistic assumptions behind Roman Bourgeois property, sought to mitigate its most obvious
distributive inequities and questioned its moral foundations. However, they did not provide an
alternative conceptualization of property. It is only in the first half of the 20th century that a new
generation of French and Italian jurists developed a new conception of property that rested on
some intuitions having affinity with the ideas underlying Hohfeld’s approach. A recent and
radical transformation in the actual life of property law, these jurists argued, demanded a new
concept of property. The decades between 1850 and 1920 witnessed momentous economic,
social, and political changes: the rapid industrialization of late-blooming economies such as
France and Italy, the agrarian crisis of the 1880s, World War I, the crisis of liberalism, and the
rise of Fascism. Under the pressure of these events, property was transformed, becoming more
limited and “specialized” or “pluralistic.” Special legislation limited the use rights and transfer
rights of owners of things of historical and artistic interest, imposed duties on owners to improve
and to cultivate their land, subjected owners of utilities or industries of critical importance for the
national economy, such as textile or manufacturing, to duties and limits. Emergency legislation
passed during World War I further limited the rights of owners of resources critical to national
security and the inventory of resources subtracted from private property and held by the state in
trust for the public was expanded to include water, forests, and mines. The protection of the
owner’s absolute rights was no longer the paramount concern and equal access to property and
the public interest became part of the vocabulary of property. These changes in the legal regime
of property were the catalysts that helped this new generation of jurists come to see the concept
of property in a new light, revealing what more than a century of Roman-Bourgeois emphasis on
the individual owner’s absolute right had obscured: that property rights have significant effects
on social relations among individuals regarding access and use of resources. Articulated in the
guise of the “social function” of property, this new concept closely interwove the empirical
registry of increasing social interdependence with a normative emphasis on the need for property
to serve a “public interest.”72
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The two jurists who made the greatest contribution to the reconceptualization of property
were the French Louis Josserand (1868-1941) and the Italian Salvatore Pugliatti (1903-1976).
The concept of property Josserand and Pugliatti developed sought to mediate two conflicting
impulses: disaggregating property into a plurality of resource-specific regimes, to reflect the
changes they were witnessing in property law, and preserving a robust core for property rights in
a Europe threatened by totalitarianism. In Pugliatti and Josserand’s new conceptualization,
property resembles a tree with a unitary trunk and many branches.73
The trunk is the essence of property, the core entitlement or entitlements necessary for a
right over a thing to be property. For Josserand and Pugliatti, the trunk is the owner’s right to
control the use of the resource.74 However, the theorists of the tree concept realized that
protecting the owner’s sphere of autonomous control was not enough and that a modern, liberal
concept of property had to acknowledge that property also implicates the public interest. The rise
of Fascism, they realized, was the consequence of liberals’ insensibility to new ideas about the
proper balance between individual rights and the interest of the collectivity. The tree-concept
jurists’ solution was to argue that owners should exercise their use-control entitlements, while
remaining mindful of property’s “social function.”75 The “social function” of property is part of
the trunk of the tree. Property, Josserand and Pugliatti suggested, had always included social
elements. At no point in history, not even in Roman law, was property absolute and the idea of a
social interest, parallel to the interest of the individual owner, had always been there.
The problem with the notion of social function was that it was hopelessly indeterminate.
Its content and the precise extent of the duties it imposed on owners were highly contested. The
tree-concept theorists’ response to indeterminacy of social function was captured in the image of
the branches of the tree. Josserand and Pugliatti drew inspiration from the Roman “law of things”
and argued that the social function concept alludes to the multiple values and interests implicated
by different resources. The branches of the property tree are many resource-specific
agglomerates of entitlements: agrarian property, family property, affordable urban residential
property, entrepreneurial property, and intellectual property. The content of the social function of
property is different for each of the branches. Because of the differences in its object, Josserand
argued, “property takes on different shapes depending on the type of resource involved. Property
is no longer uniform, rather it is multiform, infinitely diverse and varied. There is no longer one
property but many properties subject each with its own specialized regime.”76 No longer “one”
but “infinitely … varied,” property, it would seem, had again disintegrated.
III.

WHAT IS PROPERTY? TWO MODEST WAYS FORWARD

As we have seen, the specter of disintegration haunts both U.S. and European debates on
post-formalist conceptions of property, making clear the need for better answers to “what is
property.” An initial step in the right direction, we have suggested, is to break that question down
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into two distinct parts: (a) what is property about—as a distinct concept or field of law?77 and (b)
what does property consist of—in terms of its central, identifying forms of legal entitlements?
And answers to each of these can only be evaluated in light of our reasons for wanting an
answer—in light of, that is, our sense of precisely what is wrong with the forms of disintegration
corresponding to each question: unmooring dematerialization and unspooling disaggregation.
(A) What is property about? Resource-specific analysis of the objects of property
On the disintegration view, the dematerialization of the objects and interests of property
is taken to issue in the conclusion that since property rights needn’t relate to tangible “things,”
they can obtain in “anything and everything.” But if property is about everything it is also about
nothing in particular, emptying the field of any distinguishing features. And what’s wrong with
that is two-fold. First, such an intellectual move disarms us in the face of real-world cognitive
and institutional practices, where “property law” is still taught in law schools, understood as a
field of legal scholarship and its concepts regularly invoked in real-world legal disputes and
policy decisions. If these practices really are about nothing in particular, then we should at least
explain why their distinguishing boundaries nevertheless persist and, preferably, also offer some
prescriptions for reforming our conceptualization and organization of fields and practices.
But, and second, in any case they are not about nothing in particular. Rather, as is made
clear by both long-standing social practices and “external” social and political theory, they are
about the legal regulation of resources. The anchoring of property in resources may well be the
single most enduring theme in the history of European practices and theory around property
law—as we showed in Part II. And even today, no matter how loud the disintegration cry of
“there’s nothing (distinctive) there,” historical, economic, and philosophical works continue to
provide descriptive, explanatory and normative accounts of “property.” Why? Because there
really is “something” there, something of distinct significance to humans in society. And that is
how we structure social relations with respect to resources, to form persons and satisfy interests
through the allocation, production and distribution of “goods.”
By “resources” we do not mean simply some intuitive, straightforward or pre-theoretical,
notion. Rather, we mean precisely to invoke a notion requiring explicit conceptualization, one
that can be made sense of only within external frames of positive (e.g., economic) and normative
(e.g., political philosophical) analysis, those lying to a considerable extent outside of law.78
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Frames of analysis for issues such as the static allocation and dynamic production of “goodstypes” varying in rivalry and excludability, or the constitutive effects of different goods on
interests in freedom, personhood, or flourishing, or their strategic implications for values such as
distributive justice or democracy. Although developing a full account of resources along these
lines lies beyond our present scope, two important implications of having such a conception
serve as the anchor for property merit emphasis here.
First, resources so conceived are not synonymous with “things.” Not only may resources
be immaterial, but not all material objects need be resources.79 A signal example in this latter
respect are the tangible insignia subject to trademark protection. As a distinguished line of
analysis has insisted from the origins of trademark law through to the present, there is a sharp
distinction to be drawn between “misrepresentation” and “misappropriation” bases for “unfair
competition,” just as there is between “consumer confusion” and confusion-independent
“dilution” claim in trademark.80 Underlying these, we suggest, is a fundamental distinction to be
our resource-anchored view. And similarly so for points of convergence and contrast between our emphasis on
external frames of analysis of “resources” and, what we very much build on here, an emphasis on external
institutional regimes to private property for governing resources, as advanced in an important line of (principally
intellectual) property scholarship. See, e.g., William W. Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical,
Empirical and Historical Perspectives (2001), available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf;
Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural
Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); and Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: How and Why to Get
Beyond IP Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012).
79
It may be objected that, with respect to the first two points we have just made demarcating “resources” as distinct
from “things”—namely, first, that resources as an object require explicit conceptualization, rather than simply
registering a pre-theoretical perception or intuition of a pre-given (likely tangible) “thing,” and, second, that
resources so conceived need not be tangible at all—that these may also be shared by those offering a revised account
of “things,” fit for a post-dematerialization world. Indeed, an important such account, by Fredrick Pollock, serves as
a touchstone for both Professors Penner’s and Smith’s views that, dematerialization notwithstanding, the objects of
property remain “things.” PENNER, supra 4 note at 111; and Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 94, 117ff (2014). At the center of Pollock’s account is the idea that a
“thing,” for purposes of legal analysis, is simply any individuated matter of discrete rights and duties. Pollock, supra
note 318 (“A thing is, in law, some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and apart from all
others, just as, in the world of common experience, whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.”) However
illuminating in other respects Pollock’s quite brilliant treatment of this topic may be, as the basis for an account of
the objects of property, it faces a strong—we think insuperable—objection: so conceived, “things” are so general as
to run precisely the risk that one may now have “property” in “anything.” Thus, for instance, among the “things” in
which we may have property-like rights, Pollock lists the “exclusive right to ferry passengers across a river for hire
at a certain place.” Id. at 319. But this would seem precisely to usher in the disintegration of property as a distinct
field of law, very much along the lines heralded by Professor Grey. Grey, supra note 26. And, thus, to serve as an
unpromising basis upon which to re-integrate, post-dematerialization, property as a distinct field of law.
Needless to say, this is far from the last word on different proposals and bases for the “rethingification” of
the objects of property in a post-dematerialization world—including those that would simply reject dematerialization
and insist on retaining a sharp distinction between “property” in tangible things as the heart of the field, with any
legal rights in intangible things, such as those commonly referred to as “intellectual property,” as lying outside the
scope of “property” strictly speaking. Space limitations prevent us from undertaking here a fuller exploration of the
potential points of difference or convergence between two these views—(a) of “things” as the objects of property;
and (b) “resources” as the distinctive subject matter of property, as what it is about—and hence for present purposes
we will limit ourselves to simply delineating the central outlines of our contrasting “resource” view. For such a
fuller exploration, see Syed, Architecture of Property, supra note 42.
80
On misrepresentation versus misappropriation in unfair competition law, see, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, COLUM. L. REV. (1935); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165 (1948); Richard Posner, Misappropriation: A
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drawn between treating commercial insignia as “communicative” vehicles, for the sake of
regulating the integrity of market information for consumers, and treating them as “resources,”
for the sake of protecting firms’ investments in goodwill.81
Second, once we start down this road—of anchoring property in a purposive analysis of
what matters, requiring external positive and normative analysis of the object of significance
rather than simply registering lay and legal usages—there is likely to be little reason to stop at
“resources” as a crude monolith. Rather, we will likely need to break our analysis down into
resource-specific units, as suggested by categories and implications of positive and normative
analysis. Consider three illustrations. First, as revealed by positive economic analysis of goodstypes, the purpose, feasibility and desirability both of conferring exclusionary rights over
resources and of organizing their production on the basis of markets or commons or the state
vary dramatically for private, common-pool, club, toll and public goods. The virtual absence of
such elementary analytics in our current property law curriculum is disconcerting.82 Or to take a
second, more normative, frame of analysis: are there resources of such fundamental significance
for self-determination or the development of personhood—housing being a prime candidate—
that equitable access to them should be understood as imperative as a matter of “right,” and not
Dirge, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 641 (2003). On consumer confusion versus confusion-independent “dilution” claims
within trademark, see, e.g., Glyn Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367 (1999); and Mark Lemley,
The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687 (1999).
81
Such a distinction would serve as the conceptual marker for drawing two sharp substantive lines in this area: First,
between trademark and other regimes of “intellectual property” proper, such as copyright, patent and trade secret
protection. See, e.g., Peter Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECON.
1474 (A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., 2007). Second, within trademark, between “consumer confusion”
and “dilution” sources of concern. See, e.g., Lunney, id.; and Lemley, id.
82
To speak of a “virtual absence” may be thought to overstate matters, but for purposes of underlining both the
precise content of our point and our sense of its import, we think it worthwhile to state it somewhat starkly. It is not
only that a review of leading property casebooks reveals, as Julie Cohen observes, that they “are organized almost
entirely around the intricacies that attend land use and land transactions.” Julie Cohen, Property as Institutions for
Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (citing in support: “See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER
ET. AL, PROPERTY, AT XI-XXIV (8th ed. 2014); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW:
POWER, GOVERNANCES, AND THE COMMON GOOD, at vii-xv (2012); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, at xix-xxx (2d ed. 2012); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at xiii-xxviii (6th ed. 2014); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLLETTA, PROPERTY:
A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, at xi-xx (2d ed. 2012)”). But it is also that, even with respect to land, there is little by
way of external positive and normative analysis of it as a resource (indeed, as a set of distinct resources, as such
external analysis would likely conclude). Moreover, the absence of such external analytics can be felt even in the
one exceptional casebook, which explicitly seeks to remedy the “lack” of “theoretical and structural coherence” of
the “traditional” property syllabus of “a disparate set of doctrinal areas loosely tied together by their relationship to
land” – and does so by “address[ing] not only issues regard land, but also the many other resources, including
natural resources and intellectual property, that are increasingly important in our society.” JOHN P. DWYER & PETER
MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, at v (1998). Here also,
however, the distinctive positive and normative features of resources are not explicitly developed, but perceived
primarily through the prism of existing legal doctrines and categories. Id. at xix-xxix. Indeed, telling in this respect
is the reference to intangible resources as “intellectual property.” Not because it necessarily portends the hazards of
a by-gone era, where the use of “property” to refer both to the good and potential rights regarding it would tend to
smuggle normative conclusions into one’s descriptive premises. But rather because use of the same label for two
distinct notions is illustrative, we believe, of the lack of explicit conceptualization of the second notion, i.e., of the
underlying goods protected by IP rights, as resources of, e.g., “information, knowledge and culture” or “expressive
forms” and “functional ideas,” which merit being expressly conceived and analyzed as such, independently of their
existing legal treatment, and thus also require a distinctive label from the one appended to the legal rights.
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“merely” to promote social welfare or even general distributive justice?83 If so, can such goods
be classed into sufficiently coarse-grained units as to provide distinct foci of analysis from other,
more “generic” resources subject merely to the imperatives of efficiency and distribution?84 Or,
to shift lenses again, do certain resources—say, financial assets—have such strategic social
significance, impacting not only concentrations of wealth but also of power, as to merit special
attention from the vantage of democratic commitments?85 Analysis proceeding along such lines
would, we suggest, remain sensitive to important “delineation cost” concerns raised against adhoc disaggregation, while simultaneously attending to similarly significant “uniformity costs”
concerns in the other direction.86
(B) What does property consist of? Architectural analysis of the entitlements of property
On the disintegration view, the disaggregation of the entitlements of ownership is taken
to issue in the conclusion that since property rights needn’t take any one form—i.e., since the
“right” of ownership is neither a single entitlement nor any necessarily unified package of
entitlements—then property rights can take any form. And seemingly counseling in favor of this
view is an argument from flexibility: “Well at least here,” says the disintegrationist, “there can
be no complaint. Once we accept that property law, policy and theory is about the structuring of
social relations regarding resources through legal entitlements, it can only be a boon to be
maximally open-ended about the relevant entitlement options, no?”
No. The unspooling of disaggregation into an ad-hoc laundry list of entitlements is not
about analytic or institutional flexibility. Rather it is a counsel of intellectual and programmatic
disorientation. Real-world thinking and institutional design need focal points for normative and
positive analysis. A telling illustration in this respect is the fact that virtually all philosophical
treatments of property, no matter how much they initially genuflect before the “bundle of rights”
view, revert precisely to some strong “ownership” model to provide a focal point, some possible
legal content of entitlement, for purposes of positive, normative and institutional analysis.87 Thus
we agree here with the insistence of Professor Henry Smith that we need a theoretically powerful
analysis of the “architecture” of property.88 On our view, however, it should be one that does not
83

See, e.g., Nestor Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Identity in the Housing Crisis, 47 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (2012); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2007).
84
For an example of another set of goods deemed amenable to analysis as a demarcated sub-domain, on account of
their distinctive normative salience, see Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 75 (2004).
85
For an analysis of how agricultural land may have been such a strategically significant resource in an earlier phase
of the American economy, with design choices in the configuration of property entitlements having fundamental
implications for the construction of individual freedom, see Yochai Benkler, Distributive Liberty: A Relational
Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 859 (1994).
86
For “delineation costs,” see Smith, supra note 4 at 1698. For “uniformity costs” see Michael W. Carroll, One for
All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006).
87
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). SINGER, supra note 3 at 6ff (observing
that the bundle of rights model has had little impact in displacing the “ownership” model even among legally
sophisticated philosophical accounts).
88
Smith, supra note 4 at 1692-97, 1700. We should note that, as discussed above and below, Professor Smith’s
discussion of the “why and how” of an “architectural or modular theory of property” combine what we wish here to
keep separate, namely: theoretical reasons for conceptual parsimony (e.g., simplicity and generative power) and
substantive reasons for institutional parsimony (e.g., transaction costs). See note 35, supra and note 89, infra and
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prejudge substantive questions of positive, normative and institutional analysis, regarding the
existence, content and conferral of entitlements in any specific setting. Rather, its role should be
limited to providing the conceptual focal points for such substantive analysis. 89
We offer such an account here, of the fundamental building blocks of all property
analysis, consisting of four elemental entitlements: use-privilege, exclusion-right, expropriationimmunity and transfer-power. Before elaborating on the content of these entitlements, a word
about their status is in order: (a) they form a conceptually tightly integrated set, starting out from
the most basic one, a use-privilege, to build out to the rest in a series of close conceptual steps of
correlatives and opposites, primary and secondary entitlements, which in turn track core
underlying interests in resources; (b) to result in a theoretically powerful, indeed, generative,
architecture: yielding the four primitive building blocks for all property entitlement analysis, the
ones necessary and sufficient for generating all possible permutations and combinations of
property buildings; and (c) they are the differentia specifica of all property entitlements,
distinguishing the field from other areas of law.
The most basic human interest in a resource is simply to “use” it in some direct,
immediate way. It is the foundational interest upon which all others are built. Indeed, there are
two distinct reasons why the use-privilege is the basic unit of analysis, the primitive building
block for all the rest. One has been emphasized by both sides of the debate among neoBlackstonians: namely the “substantive” or “external” point that, simply as a matter of human
interests, the primary interest in resources is not to exclude others but to use ourselves.90 But
accompanying text. It is with the former that we are concernedhere, in our effort conceptually to specify the focal
points for any substantive—i.e., positive, normative and institutional—analysis of real-world property arrangements.
We bracket here the latter, substantive issues, such as how to weigh, in evaluating and shaping such arrangements,
considerations of administrative simplicity against fine-grained pursuit of social policy objectives.
89
Thus our approach is less substantive and more conceptual than most alternatives to unspooled disaggregation that
have been proposed by critics of the Hohfeldian view, taking the form of an “essence” or “core” of property. Many
of these accounts base their views of a core entitlement or set of entitlements in a substantive normative conception
of the central interests that ought to be protected by property rights as a general matter. See, e.g., Penner, supra note
1 at 742ff; PENNER, supra note 4 at 71ff; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO
L. J. 275 (2008); and Claeys, supra note 1 at 631ff (defending a “core” or “essence” of “exclusive use,” centered on
normative considerations of autonomy). Or, alternatively, in substantive positive-cum-normative suppositions
concerning the relative merits of facilitating market-based private ordering versus directly pursuing social policy
objectives. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing for a limited menu of property forms based on
“information” and “frustration” cost concerns). By contrast, our aim is simply to specify, as a conceptual matter, the
elemental building blocks that are the necessary and sufficient focal points for any substantive account of what
matters in terms of the positive, normative and institutional analysis of the design of property rights. Much closer to
our focus on conceptual, over substantive, considerations is Professor Smith’s more recent emphasis on formal
criteria such as simplicity and generative power in devising and evaluating theories of property’s architecture.
Smith, supra note 4 at 1694-95. On our view, however, Professor Smith’s category of “delineation costs” straddles
the divide between more formal and substantive criteria, in part being concerned with the theoretical costs of undue
complexity, in giving up conceptual simplicity and generative power, and in part with more substantive costs of such
complexity, in terms of real-world “information costs” in administering property rights. Smith, id. at 1698.
90
Thus, even those advancing a “right to exclude” as the “core” or “essence” of property have typically recognized
that, as a substantive normative matter, interests in use are prior to, indeed provide the basis for, those in exclusion.
See Penner, supra note 1 at 743 (“use justifies the right, while exclusion frames the practical essence of the right”);
PENNER, supra note 4 at 71 (“the right to property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the
interest we have in the use of things”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
731 (1998) (“the right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of
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there is also a tighter, more internal-conceptual reason: you simply cannot specify the content of
(the concept of) Exclusion, without first already possessing the content of (the concept of) Use.
But this is not so for Use. We cannot understand what it means for A to exclude B from Y unless
we already possess some notion of exclude “from what”? But we can understand what it means
for A to “use” Y without possessing any notion of “exclusion.”
If A has the legal entitlement to use resource Y, this means of course that B has no
entitlement to exclude A from Y. And so we arrive at our first entitlement-disentitlement pair:
(1) (a) Use-privilege of A
which correlates with
(b) no-right of Exclusion for B
What is our next step from here? For lawyers already familiar with various contingencies
and options, any number of alternative next moves suggest themselves, including: What if B did
have an exclusion-right? What if A had a use-right? What if A had an exclusion-right? While we
could build out the analysis taking any of these steps, we suggest that in fact the most basic and
obvious next step, conceptually, is simply to ask: can B still have a Use-privilege over Y as well?
That is, not to introduce any new concepts/entitlements or persons or resources, but simply to
transfer an existing known entitlement over a known resource to a known person. The answer, of
course, is yes: alongside, simultaneously with, A’s use-privilege may co-exist B’s use-privilege.
At this point, the next question virtually forces itself upon us: What would it mean for
only one of them to have the use-privilege? Suppose the uses in question are rivalrous of the
resource and we wish only to let either A or B to use it. We would then need to confer upon one
of them the opposite of what correlates with a use-privilege: i.e., not a no-right of exclusion but
an exclusion-right. Which of course in turn correlates with a no-privilege to use, or a duty to
refrain from using. To result in the following two pairs of entitlements:
(1) (a) Use-privilege of A
which correlates with
which is the opposite of
(b) no-right of Exclusion for B

(2) (a) Exclusion-right of B
which correlates with
(b) no-privilege to Use for A

property”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 3
(2014) (agreeing with PENNER, supra note 4 that interests in use are a precondition for the right to exclude, while
maintaining that exclusion-entitlements, not use-entitlements, are the “defining feature” of property); Smith, supra
note at 4 at 1693 (“There is no interest in exclusion per se. Instead, … the right to exclude … serve[s] the interest in
use.”) (For a dissenting view, arguing that exclusion stands on its own bottom, see Arthur Ripstein, Possession and
Use, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF PROPERTY LAW 156 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith, eds. 2013).) Others,
by contrast, insist that the normative priority of use-interests should issue in a conceptual priority of useentitlements, so that the core or essence of property is conceived in terms of “exclusive use”—i.e., a bundling
together (or, less charitably, a muddling as one) the distinct Hohfeldian entitlements of a use-privilege and
exclusion-right (although with less than crystalline clarity on whether the core or essential use-entitlement is to be
understood in terms of a “privilege” or a “right”). See Claeys, supra note 1 at 631ff; Katz, supra note 89. (We
should note that Professor Smith has also underlined the incompleteness of “the right to exclude” as a “linchpin” or
“core” for property law, and emphasized the need to supplement it with an account of “things” as the object of
property. Smith, supra note 79. From our vantage however, that goes to a distinct issue, concerning not what
property consists of, but rather what property is about—and our reasons for preferring, in that latter respect,
“resources” over “things” are briefly given in note 79, infra.)
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It is worth dwelling for a moment on the conceptual inter-relations between entitlements
and how they unfold. We began with a concept of an entitlement and then moved to understand
what its jural correlative was. At that point, we had no idea—or even the need for an idea—of
something called its “opposite.” The move to develop a concept of the opposite of an entitlement
only happens at a subsequent stage of the analysis, when we go on either (a) to ask, as a kind of
formal matter, what if B did have what they do not have here? or (b) more substantively, to
inquire into a distinct new interest (what if we needed to enable B not only to use but prevent A
from using)? This point, seemingly elementary, is quite fundamental: the failure to appreciate the
conceptual centrality and priority of correlatives over opposites is precisely to fail to grasp the
relational method of Hohfeldian analysis.91 Foregrounding, as is often done, jural “opposites” as
central to the analysis92—rather than understanding them as entirely derivative of a correlativethen-distinct-interest structure of the analysis93—is precisely to invite the (on our view)
misleading understanding of Hohfeldian analysis as “atomistic.”94
Returning back from method to substance, we now have before us the basic quartet of
Hohfeldian entitlement-disentitlements concerning resources. This quartet pertains of course
solely to “primary” entitlements-disentitlements, meaning here entitlements (that structure
relations) pertaining directly to the object or resource itself. We now continue to the second
quartet, of “secondary” entitlements, or entitlements about entitlements.
Suppose we have conferred upon A both a use-privilege and exclusion-right relating to a
house, which is now their “home.” What secondary entitlement might make sense as the next
step? We suggest that it is immunity from expropriation of their primary use and exclusion
entitlements, to protect their interest in “security” in holding said entitlements over their home.
What good is it to enjoy use and exclusion over one’s home on Monday without any security that
these entitlements cannot simply be “taken” on Tuesday, by either a private person or the state?
This brings us to our third entitlement-disentitlement pair:
91

For important discussions of Hohfeldian analysis in a somewhat distinct “structuralist” vein, see Jack Balkin, The
Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 119 (1990); and Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of
Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991). Our analysis here places greater emphasis than these authors on
the purposive and concretely relational—as opposed to self-contained and generally “structuralist”—character of
Hohfeldian analysis, i.e., on grounding the relevant conceptual distinctions, between discrete entitlements, in
substantive judgments concerning important differences in underlying interests-in-resources, and grounding the
relevant conceptual inter-relations, between correlatives, in the underlying social relations they track.
92
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient? 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711,
752-53, 759 (1980); and Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, WISC. L. REV. 975, 986-87 (1982). We should note that the foregrounding of opposites in these pioneering
articles runs against the grain of their animating aim in recovering Hohfeldian analysis—namely, to retrieve it from
the sawdust of formal taxonomies—an aim that we share and are indebted to.
93
To underline the point as clearly as we can, in contrast to a long-standing tradition of foregrounding opposites
such as “right/no-right” as the center of the analysis, on our view the central relations and contrasts of significance
are privilege/no-right and privilege-right—with “right/no-right” simply having no real significance at all on its own.
In other words, it is not only that jural correlatives such as privilege/no-right or right/duty are conceptually prior and
the central drivers of the analysis. But also that jural opposites are not even of secondary significance on their own:
they are merely the connective tissue between two distinct pairs of jural correlatives, as shown in our basic quartet
of primary entitlement-disentitlements above. The important relations or contrasts are: (a) first, the inter-relations
between jural correlatives (privilege/no-right, right/duty); and (b) next, the distinctions between different pairs of
correlatives (privilege vs. right). Jural opposites such as right/no-right are of unclear import standing alone.
94
See Smith, supra note 39 (treating Hohfeldian analysis as “atomistic); Schlag, supra note 31 at 218-233 (accepting
characterization of Hohfeldian analysis as atomistic, but defending it against some perils associated with atomism).
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(3) (a) Expropriation-immunity (of A)
which correlates with
(b) No-power/disability to transfer (of other private persons or state)
And again we face the ineluctable question: what if A did not have this entitlement, or at
least not against all parties? What if, for instance, we conferred upon A this entitlement only
against private persons, but not the state? We would then we arrive at a fourth pair:
(4) (a) Transfer-power (of the state)
which correlates with
(b) Liability (vulnerability-to-loss) (of A)
An interesting feature of this analysis is that it resolves, at least for this pair, the puzzle
raised long ago by Walter Wheeler Cook and Arthur Corbin as to whether a Hohfeldian
“liability” or exposure of B, correlating with the transfer power of A, is really a
“disadvantage”—since often B is the one in a position to receive the entitlement.95 Here,
however, the liability correlating to the state’s transfer power is that of A, who is vulnerable to
having their primary entitlements transferred away. This, clearly, is a disadvantage to, or
burdening of, A’s interests. Hence at least for this correlative pair, the Cook-Corbin puzzled is
solved.
This completes our analysis of the four fundamental building block entitlementdisentitlement pairs of property, those necessary and sufficient for generating all permutations
and combinations of property structures—the differentia specifica of property as a legal form.96
Conclusion
Imagine a property law casebook organized around the interaction of two levels of
analysis: (1) the “stuff of the world,” as broken down into resource-specific categories conceived
in terms of their (im)material characteristics, human interests and social significance; and (2) the
“building blocks of society” conceived in terms of the fundamental entitlement options necessary
and sufficient for constructing all the legal architectures of social relations regarding resources.
95

See Walter Wheeler Cook, Introduction: Hohfeld’s Contribution to the Science of Law, in WESLEY NEWCOMB
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 8 (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed. 1919); and Arthur Corbin, Legal
Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L. J. 163, 169 (1921).
96
To be sure, this is only the barest sketch both of the content of the elemental entitlements and of their architectural
status. Regarding their content, what is important to underline is that our analysis does not provide any argument in
favor or against the existence, shape or conferral of any of these entitlements, either singly or in their combined
configuration, in any specific setting. That of course is the work of concrete legal analysis and institutional design,
ideally sensitive to the distinct contexts and purposes implicated by different resources, in terms of the positive,
normative and strategic concerns they raise. And it is indeed precisely our aim here not to pre-judge such substantive
analysis, but rather simply to furnish the focal points indispensable for organizing the inquiry. Regarding their
architectural status, a further step of institutional analysis, not undertaken here, would be to specify not only how
these elements may be used as fundamental building blocks in the configuration of all specific ensembles of
property rights, but also how such ensembles may then usefully be conceived and labeled as belonging to larger
families of, e.g., “private,” versus “commons” versus “public” property regimes. Or, to move even farther afield, to
specify when an institutional regime for structuring the allocation, production and distribution of resources may be
said to leave “property” altogether (as it might be said, for instance, of “prize” system alternatives to patent rights).
These are matters for another day. See Syed, Architecture of Property, forthcoming.
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That such a curriculum is even now only a glimmer on the horizon—a full century after
Hohfeld—is one measure of the distance by which this pioneer’s thoughts outstripped his world.
To honor his legacy would be to bridge that gap.
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